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Abstract
Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts
of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to
which to believe justifiably is to know [Sutton 2005, 2007, Littlejohn 2015a,b,
Williamson 2000, 2010], a knowledge first version of accessibilism [Millar
2010] and a knowledge first version of mentalism [Bird 2007]. This paper
offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is
preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first
virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems that its
competition encounters.
Introduction
Knowledge first epistemology (KFE) has been on the rise in recent epistemological
literature. For the purposes of this paper, I take its core theses to be the following.
First, according to KFE, knowledge does not admit of reductive analysis in terms
of justified belief. That is to say, no non-circular set of individually necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge including justified belief can be given.
Second, KFE reverses the traditional direction of analysis in epistemology: rather
than analysing knowledge in terms of justified belief, justified belief is analysed in
terms of knowledge.1
The main motivation for KFE is that the project of reductively analysing knowl-
edge in terms of justified belief is marked by a series of failures. Since Gettier’s
seminal 1963 paper, there has been a flurry of proposed analyses of knowledge.
1 Note that Timothy Williamson, the most prominent champion of KFE, also accepts a number
of further theses, including that knowledge is a mental state in its own right and that belief is to
be analysed in terms of knowledge [Williamson 2000, 2010]. In this way, Williamson’s version of
KFE makes epistemology part of the philosophy of mind. I’d like to flag that my project is not as
ambitious as Williamson’s. Rather, my version of KFE is restricted to the purely epistemological
theses stated above. In fact, my views diverge from Williamson’s on a number of issues. For that
reason, I’d like to ask readers not to take the fact that I consider my view a version of KFE to
mean that I consider it a view that Williamson would accept or even a view that is compatible with
Williamson’s.
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Despite these efforts, no analysis is even widely accepted in contemporary litera-
ture. On the contrary, the debate is characterised by ever more sophisticated anal-
yses and ever more sophisticated Gettier-style counterexamples.2 Champions of
KFE have taken this development to indicate that the traditional analytical project
is a degenerating research programme and have proposed KFE as an alternative
[e.g. Williamson 2000: 31, Bird 2007: 82]. I am inclined to agree. Moreover, for
the purposes of this paper, I will simply assume that these considerations provide
good enough reason to adopt KFE or at least to make the view worth exploring. I
will not go into the motivations for KFE in any more detail.3
This paper focuses on KFE accounts of justified belief. To facilitate the dis-
cussion I would like to introduce a distinction between two variations of such
accounts: strong and weak. An account of justified belief is strong if and only if it
construes justified belief as requiring knowledge. An account of justified belief is
weak if and only if it is not strong. Strong KFE accounts of justified belief are per-
haps the most prominent ones in the literature. Their champions include Jonathan
Sutton [2005, 2007], Clayton Littlejohn [2015a, 2015b] Alan Millar [2010], along-
side Williamson [2000, 2010]. I will outline two strong KFE accounts of justified
belief and argue that these accounts succumb, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, to a
version of the Gettier problem (§1). §2 turns to weak accounts and, in particular,
to a recent proposal due to Alexander Bird [2007]. I argue that Bird’s account
also remains unsatisfactory on two counts: first, it also falls prey to a version of
the Gettier problem and, second, it fails to accommodate a plausible transmission
principle for justified belief. In §3, I will outline a new kind of weak KFE account
of justified belief, to wit, a knowledge first virtue epistemological one. Finally, I
argue that this account steers clear of the problems on both sides (§4).
1 Strong Knowledge First Accounts of Justified Belief
This section introduces two strong KFE accounts of justified belief. The first has
been defended by Sutton, Littlejohn and Williamson, whereas the second is due to
Alan Millar. I will start with Sutton’s, Littlejohn’s and Williamson’s view.
1.1 Knowledge First Reductionism
Sutton, Littlejohn and Williamson endorse an appealingly simple KFE account of
justified belief. The idea here is that justified belief reduces to knowledge. They
thus accept the following reductionist KFE account of justified belief:
2 For overviews over the post-Gettier literature see [Slaght 1977, Shope 1983, Lycan 2006].
3 For a detailed argument that the knowledge first virtue epistemology is preferable to tradition-
alist virtue epistemology see [Kelp 2015b,d]. In a nutshell, key to my argument is that traditionalist
versions of virtue epistemology encounter a version of what’s become known as the creditworthi-
ness dilemma [Lackey 2007, 2009, Pritchard 2008, Pritchard et al. 2010]. However, unlike standard
versions of this dilemma my version of it has Frankfurt cases [Kelp 2009] on one horn and fake
barn cases on the other. For arguments that traditionalist versions of virtue epistemology can escape
other versions of the dilemma see [Kelp 2011, 2013a,b, 2014].
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Knowledge First Reductionism (KFR). One justifiably believes p if and only if one knows
p.
Crucially, of course, the direction of analysis proceeds from right to left: justified
belief is analysed in terms of knowledge. In this way knowledge comes first.
It is easy to see that KFR entails that a belief is justified only if it qualifies as
knowledge. Hence, KFR is a strong KFE account of justified belief in the sense
specified above.
1.2 Knowledge First Accessibilism
A different strong account has been proposed by Alan Millar who endorses a
knowledge first accessibilism about justified belief. To see how Millar’s view
works, it will be useful to first have a look at his account of knowledge. Accord-
ing to Millar, knowledge requires the exercise of an ability to know. For instance,
perceptual knowledge requires the exercise of an ability to tell that something is
thus-and-so from the way it appears. Conversely, when one exercises an ability to
know that something is thus and so, one does come to know that it is thus-and-so.4
Moreover, one comes to know that it is thus and so in a specific way. For instance,
when you exercise your ability to tell that the animal before you is a zebra from the
way it looks, you see that it is a zebra, where seeing that something is thus-and-so
is a way of knowing that it is thus-and-so.
With these points in play, let’s move on to Millar’s account of justified belief.
While Millar does not offer an explicit definition of justified belief, there is a clear
enough account implicit in the text. In what follows, I will try to briefly reconstruct
this account.
According to Millar, “justified belief involves being in a position to justify
one’s belief” and that justifying one’s belief is “understood in terms of possession
of a reason to believe.” [2010: 113, n.15] These remarks suggest a broadly acces-
sibilist account of justification according to which justification requires possession
of reasons that one must be in a position to access to ensure that one will be able
to justify one’s belief should the occasion to do so arise.5
What makes Millar’s accessibilism distinctively knowledge first epistemolog-
ical is his account of the reasons that are required for justified belief. Here is
Millar:
[I]nstead of explaining the knowledge as, so to speak, built up from justified
belief, we treat the knowledge as what enables one to be justified in believing.
Knowing that the animal is a zebra through seeing that it is enables me to be
justified in believing that it is.
[Millar 2010: 139]
4 This is because, according to Millar, the notion of exercise of ability is a success notion. One
cannot exercise an ability to φ unless one φs.
5 Prominent champions of accessibilism include Roderick Chisholm [1977], Laurence BonJour
[1985], William Alston [1989] and Robert Audi [1993]. The link between the ability to justify
belief and accessibilism is defended e.g. in [Alston 1989: 236].
3
The thought here is that it is precisely the ways of knowing that furnish the reasons
required for justified belief. When you exercise your ability to tell that the animal
before you is a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know that it is a zebra
in a specific way: you see that it is. The fact that you see that it is a zebra in turn
constitutes a reason to believe that it is. What’s more, it is the kind of reason fur-
nished by ways of knowing that, according to Millar, is the kind of reason required
for justified belief.
The question remains whether Millar’s knowledge first accessibilism qualifies
as strong in the above sense. To answer it, notice first that Millar takes the reasons
required for justified belief that p to be ways of knowing that p. If so, it is easy
to see that one’s belief that p will be justified only if one knows that p. Millar’s
account qualifies as a strong KFE account of justified belief.
1.3 Gettier Strikes Back
One might think that once the traditional analytical project is abandoned in favour
of a knowledge first approach to epistemology, we can finally put the Gettier prob-
lem to one side. Of course, this is true in the sense that we will no longer need to
search for a condition on knowledge that deals with Gettier cases, or, at the very
least, not one that can be specified without invoking the concept of knowledge.
Unfortunately, however, the Gettier problem is not that easy to get rid of. There is
a variation of the problem that arises for knowledge first epistemological accounts
of justified belief. To see this, let’s take a look at the following well-known case:
Fake Barns. You are driving through the countryside and take a look out of the window of
your car. You see what appears to be a barn in the field and form a perceptual belief
that you are looking at a barn. Unbeknownst to you, you are looking at one of the
few real barns in an area peppered with barn façades that are so cleverly constructed
as to be indistinguishable from real barns from your position on the road [Goldman
1976].
The familiar point about Gettier cases is that their protagonists lack knowledge. In
the present case, you do not know that you are looking at a barn. But now notice
that it is equally plausible that the beliefs of agents in Gettier cases are justified.
This should not come as much of a surprise. After all, Gettier cases were intended
as counterexamples to the justified true belief account of knowledge. If it weren’t
plausible that the relevant agents’ beliefs are justified, Gettier cases wouldn’t have
made for convincing counterexamples to this view in the first place. Unlike the
intuition of absence of knowledge, the intuition that justified belief is present in
Gettier cases is of interest at least to KFE accounts of justified belief. It is an
intuition such accounts need to accommodate.
It is easy to see that strong KFE accounts of justified belief encounter this
version of the Gettier problem. After all, intuitively, Gettier cases are are cases in
which agents have justified beliefs that fall short of knowledge. Since, according
to strong KFE accounts of justified belief, justified belief entails knowledge, and
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since champions of KFE accept that agents in Gettier cases lack knowledge, they
will have to accept the counterintuitive result that their beliefs are not justified.
In fact, the range of problematic cases for strong KFE accounts of justified
belief extends significantly beyond Gettier cases. To see this, just consider the
non-lucky counterparts of Gettiered agents who end up with false beliefs. (In
what follows, I will also refer to these cases as ‘Counterpart cases’.) For instance,
consider a variation of Fake Barns in which you look out of the window of your
car a couple of minutes earlier and end up looking at a fake barn. When, in this
case, you form the belief that you are looking at a barn, your belief will be false.
Intuitively, however, it is also justified. Since knowledge is factive, however, your
belief falls short of knowledge. As a result, champions of strong KFE accounts of
justified belief will have to accept the counterintuitive result here too.6
1.4 The Blamelessness Response
Champions of strong KFE accounts are of course aware that their accounts run
into this problem. In fact, they accept that agents in Gettier and Counterpart cases
do not have justified beliefs. What is going on, they claim, is that the intuition of
justification is not trustworthy in these cases. The beliefs of agents in Gettier and
Counterpart cases are blameless but not justified. Those who have the intuition
of justification mistake blamelessness for justification [Littlejohn 2015b, Millar
2010: 102-3, Sutton 2005, Sutton 2007: 33-34, Williamson 2010, 2014].
I believe that this response remains unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it
collapses a normative difference worth marking in epistemology. Second, the in-
tuition of justification is not the only reason to think that agents in Gettier and
Counterpart cases have justified beliefs.
To see the first point, consider the following two cases:
Insanity. You have gone insane. As a result, you form your beliefs in all sorts of crazy
manners. When hearing the wind blow you think your long lost love is speaking to
you, when the sky is red at sunset, you think that doom is impending, and so on.
Benighted Isolation. You are part of an isolated and benighted community the members
of which share a common belief that thunderstorms indicate that their twenty-eared
6 In a similar vein, one might consider pressing the new evil demon problem [Lehrer and Co-
hen 1983, Cohen 1984] against strong KFE accounts of justified belief. This problem exploits
the intuition that agents in sceptical scenarios have justified beliefs to argue against a variety of
externalist accounts of justification. It is easy to see that strong KFE accounts of justified belief
face the new evil demon problem. At the same time, it is also easy to see that the problem Gettier
and Counterpart cases pose for strong KFE accounts of justified belief is of a kind with the new
evil demon problem. Both venture to show that strong KFE accounts are too strong. The reason I
favour Gettier and Counterpart cases to make this point is twofold. First, it avoids the charge that
the difficulty is generated by problematic internalist intuitions. After all, the intuition that agents in
Gettier and Counterpart cases have justified belief is shared by many externalists. Second, Gettier
and Counterpart cases are less extravagant cases than the sceptical cases at issue in the new evil
demon problem. In fact, they are a part of everyday life. If so, the intuition cannot be discredited
solely on the grounds that the cases are too extravagant to generate trustworthy intuitions in the
first place.
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deity is about to scratch its largest left ear. Just now you are witnessing a thunder-
storm and come to believe that the deity is about to scratch an ear.
In both of these cases you form a blameless belief. This is confirmed by the follow-
ing two widely accepted theses concerning blamelessness: (B1) one is blameless
for φ -ing if it is out of one’s control that one φs; (B2) one is blameless for φ -
ing if one φs in the light of good reason to believe that φ -ing is permissible [e.g.
Haji 1998, Zimmermann 1997].7 Insanity is an instance of (B1). Here it is out
of your control that you believe that doom is impending. You have gone insane.
Benighted Isolation is instance of (B2). In this case, your belief about impending
ear-scratching is formed in the light of good reason to believe that it is permissi-
ble. After all, you reasonably believe that thunderstorms indicate ear-scratching
and that a thunderstorm has occurred. If so you have good reason to believe that
it is permissible for you believe as you do. Moreover, since you base your be-
lief on reasonable beliefs that provide you with good reason to believe that it is
permissible, you believe in the light of this reason.
Crucially, there is a difference between agents in Gettier and Counterpart cases
on the one hand, and agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted Isolation on the
other. Agents in the Gettier and Counterpart cases form their beliefs in perfectly
fine ways, ways that normally lead them toward epistemic goods such as true belief
or knowledge. In contrast, agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted Isolation
form their beliefs in highly problematic ways, ways that will normally not bring
them on the path toward epistemic good. In this way, agents in the former cases are
in a much stronger epistemic position than agents in the latter cases. Their beliefs
have a connection with knowledge and truth that the beliefs of agents in cases like
Insanity and Benighted Isolation lack altogether. To see this, compare, for example
Fake Barns and Benighted Isolation. In Fake Barns, you are simply unlucky not
to acquire knowledge on this occasion, whereas, in Benighted Isolation you fail
to acquire knowledge because you are part of a community that is on the wrong
epistemic track entirely.
This difference is a difference worth marking in epistemology. One reason for
this is that marking this difference enables us to select the right course of action
when working toward improvements of the agents’ future epistemic performances.
For agents in cases like Benighted Isolation and Insanity we will need to get agents
to change the ways in which they form their beliefs. For agents in Gettier and
Counterpart cases, in contrast, this is not necessary. Accordingly, when aiming
for future improvements, a different strategy would seem more appropriate. For
instance, we might consider engineering a more hospitable epistemic environment.
In fact, the difference is a difference worth marking as a distinctively normative
difference in epistemology. It makes sense to evaluate the beliefs of agents in
7 See [Kelp 2015a] for a full account of blameless action that incorporates both (B1) and (B2).
Could it be the case that one φs in the light of good reason to believe that φ -ing is permissible whilst
one should have known that φ -ing is impermissible? Perhaps. However, for present purposes, this
issue is of little importance. Accordingly, I will simply assume that one cannot φs in the light of
good reason to believe that φ -ing is permissible when one should have known that it isn’t.
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Gettier and Counterpart cases positively and the beliefs of agents in cases like
Insanity and Benighted Isolation negatively. To see that it makes sense to evaluate
the beliefs of agents in Gettier and Counterpart cases positively, note that so doing
will reinforce their ways of proceeding as epistemic agents, which is a good thing
because agents will start to reap epistemic goods again as soon as they are back
in epistemically more hospitable territories [cf. Bird 2007: 106]. In contrast, it
makes sense to evaluate the beliefs of agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted
Isolation negatively because so doing will discourage agents from continuing in
their ways of proceeding as epistemic agents, which is also good thing given that
no epistemic goods are to be gained by their way of proceeding. (Of course, it also
makes sense grant these agents an excuse for proceeding in the way they do, but
this point is by-the-by here.)
With these points in play, it can be argued that Gettier and Counterpart cases
pose a problem for strong KFE accounts of justified belief independently of the
intuition that agents in these cases have justified belief. To see this notice first
that it is hard to see how champions of strong KFE accounts of justified belief can
accommodate the aforementioned normative difference between agents in Gettier
and Counterpart cases and agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted Isolation, at
least on the present strategy. If the only thing that the beliefs of agents in Gettier
and Counterpart cases have going for themselves is that they are blameless, then
they are on par with the beliefs of agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted
Isolation. The normative difference between agents in Gettier and Counterpart
cases on the one hand and agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted Isolation is
going to be lost. Since this difference is a difference worth marking, this means
strong KFE accounts of justified belief collapse a difference worth marking.8
Let’s move on, then, to the question of whether there is reason to think that be-
liefs of agents in Gettier and Counterpart case are justified, other than the contested
intuition. I believe that the answer to this question is ‘yes’. The beliefs of agents in
Gettier and Counterpart cases have a couple of properties that are widely consid-
ered to be hallmark properties of justified belief, to wit, the property of enjoying a
strong connection to truth and knowledge (P1), and the property of having positive
normative status (P2). That the beliefs of agents in Gettier and Counterpart have P1
8 [Littlejohn 2015b] draws a distinction among blameless agents between agents who get an
excuse and agents who get an exemption. In the case of exemptions the rational capacities of
the blameless agent are absent or compromised. In contrast, agents who are blameless but have
intact rational capacities get excuses [Littlejohn 2015b: 10]. Could champions of strong KFE
accounts of justified belief venture to accommodate the difference between agents in Gettier and
Counterpart cases on the one hand and agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted Isolation on
the other by means of the distinction between exemptions and excuses? It is easy to see that
the answer to this question is ‘no’. While agents in cases like Insanity come out as getting an
exemption on Littlejohn’s view, agents in cases like Benighted Isolation will get an excuse. After
all, their rational capacities are in perfect working order. Even with the proposed distinction in play,
champions of strong KFE accounts of justified belief will be unable to accommodate the difference
between agents in Gettier and Counterpart cases on the one hand and agents in cases like Benighted
Isolation on the other.
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was argued above. And while I haven’t strictly speaking shown that these beliefs
also have P2, I believe that I have come pretty close. After all, I have effectively
argued that it makes sense to accord positive normative status to these beliefs. But
since it plausibly makes sense to accord positive normative status to these beliefs
only if they do indeed have positive normative status, it is also plausible that the
beliefs of agents in Gettier and Counterpart cases have P2. The fact that the beliefs
of agents in Gettier and Counterpart cases have properties that are widely consid-
ered to be hallmark properties of justified belief confirms the hypothesis that these
beliefs are indeed justified.9
The fact that the blamelessness response collapses a normative difference worth
marking in epistemology suggests that this response remains unsatisfactory. This
suggestion is reinforced by the fact that we have more reason to believe that the be-
liefs of agents in Gettier and Counterpart cases are justified than just the contested
intuition. In this way, there is not only evidence that the blamelessness response
is unsuccessful, but also some positive reason to think that the beliefs of agents in
Gettier cases are justified after all. If so, strong KFE accounts do face the Gettier
problem.
2 Weak Knowledge First Accounts of Justified Belief
Perhaps, then, knowledge first epistemologists should start looking for a weaker
account of justified belief, one that allows for justification in Gettier and Coun-
terpart cases. One promising proposal on this front has been made by Alexander
Bird. Let’s take a look at it.
2.1 Bird’s Knowledge First Mentalism
In his 2007 paper, Bird offers the following knowledge first version of a mentalist
approach to justified belief:
KNOWLEDGE FIRST MENTALISM (KFM). If in world w1 S has mental states M and
then forms a [belief], that [belief] is justified if and only if there is some world w2
where, with the same mental states M, S forms a corresponding [belief] and that
[belief qualifies as] knowledge.
[Bird 2007: 84]
In order to get a good grasp of what exactly KFM amounts to, we also need to be
clear on (a) which mental states we need to hold fixed when applying KFM and (b)
what makes for a corresponding belief. The crucial point concerning (a) that needs
to be kept in mind is that Bird accepts that there are factive mental states and that
knowledge is a mental state in its own right that fits this description [Bird 2007:
82]. Thus, what we need to hold fixed in our applications of KFM is not only
9 It is easy to see that the beliefs of agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted Isolation do not
have all of these hallmark properties of justified belief. In particular, they do not have P1 and P2.
If so, we have reason to think that the beliefs of agents in these cases are not justified.
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the relevant agent’s non-factive mental states (states like experiences, apparent
memories, intuitions and beliefs) but also the agent’s factive mental states. In
particular, we also need to hold the agent’s knowledge fixed. Moreover, while we
will always have to hold fixed the agent’s mental states at the start of the belief
forming process, sometimes we will even have to hold fixed larger stretches of the
agent’s mental history. Since Bird himself thinks that the relevant mental states can
in every case be extended “to include a person’s total mental history” [2007: 86],
for the purposes of this paper, I will interpret KFM in this way. Concerning (b),
Bird claims that a belief at a possible world corresponds to an actual belief if, first,
there is “at most a minor variation in content” and, second, the belief is formed in
the same way and that is to say it is “produced by the same mental dispositions
and capacities” [2007: 87].
2.2 Transmission of Justification
There is reason to believe that KFM can improve on strong KFE accounts of jus-
tified belief in that it successfully predicts the presence of justified belief in cases
like Fake Barns and its counterpart. After all, while in these cases your belief
that you are looking at a barn falls short of knowledge there are possible worlds
at which you have the same mental history as you do in the actual world and yet
come to know that you are looking at a barn. One such world is a world at which
there are no fake barns in the environment.
While KFM thus makes some progress on strong KFE accounts of justified
belief, unfortunately, the view runs into problems with a different kind of Gettier
case. Consider:
Inference. You are driving through the countryside and take a look out of the window of
your car. You see what appears to be a barn in the field and form a perceptual belief
that you are looking at a barn. Your perceptual belief is false. The structure you
are looking at is a fake. A while later, you remember that in your logic course you
learned that disjunction introduction is a valid rule of inference. By a competent
application of this rule to your belief that you were looking at a barn earlier on you
form the belief that either you were looking at a barn or the the number of stars
in the universe is even. Your belief is true. The number of stars in the universe is
indeed even.
Inference is another classical Gettier case. In fact, it’s a variation of one of Gettier’s
original cases. Unsurprisingly, we find the characteristic pattern of intuitions here
too. The belief you arrive at is justified and true but falls short of knowledge. Can
KFM accommodate the intuition of justification here?
To answer this question we need to ask whether anyone with the same mental
history could have acquired knowledge instead. Crucially, recall that knowledge
is taken to be a mental state in its own right. This means that, when answering this
question, we need to hold fixed that your premise belief falls short of knowledge.
After all, if it did qualify as knowledge, your mental history would have been
different. But now notice that you cannot come to know the conclusion of your
9
inference unless you know the premise. If so, at any world at which your premise
belief that falls short of knowledge, you do not end up knowing the conclusion
belief. Moreover, this is no matter what the content of the conclusion belief may
be.10 As a result, there is no possible world at which you have the same mental
history as in Inference at which you arrive at the same belief or at a corresponding
belief that qualifies as knowledge. By, KFM, then your belief in Inference is not
justified. KFM, too, faces the Gettier problem.
Again, the issue here is not just an intuitive one. Again, there is an underlying
theoretical problem. To see this consider first the following plausible transmission
principle for justified belief:
TRANSMISSION-JB. If one competently deductively reasons from p to q; if one there-
upon comes to believe that q; and if one justifiably believes that p throughout, then
one’s belief that q is justified.11
The underlying theoretical problem for KFM here is that KFM is incompatible
with TRANSMISSION-JB. Given that competent deductive reasoning cannot gener-
ate knowledge from non-knowledge, it is easy to show that, on KFM, TRANSMISSION-
JB fails in all cases in which the premise belief is justified but falls short of knowl-
edge.12 Here is how. Let S be any subject, b1 be any justified premise belief
that falls short of knowledge and b2 any conclusion belief arrived at by compe-
tent deduction from b1. By KFM the worlds that are relevant to whether b2 is
justified in the actual world is a subset, Σ, of the worlds at which b1 falls short
of knowledge. Since competent deductive reasoning cannot generate knowledge
10 One might worry here that I am effectively assuming the truth of ‘Counter-Transmission’, the
principle that competent deductive reasoning can generate knowledge only if the premise beliefs
are known. This principle has recently come under attack [Warfield 2005, Klein 2008, Luzzi 2010].
Even if Counter-Transmission is false as a general principle, there will be many true instances of
it. Moreover, all that I need for my argument at this point is that the relevant instances of Counter-
Transmission are true. However, this is independently plausible. After all, it is uncontroversial
that you are simply not in a position to know that the number of stars in the universe is even. If
so, you can know that either you were looking at a barn or the number of stars in the universe is
even via an inference from the proposition that you were looking at a barn only if you know that
you were looking at a barn. And the same holds, mutatis mutandis, in cases in which you form
“corresponding” conclusion beliefs, e.g. if you form a conclusion belief that you were looking at
a barn or the number of stars in the universe is odd/prime/perfect, etc. via an inference from the
proposition that you were looking at a barn.
11 There is a live debate on whether TRANSMISSION-JB affords substantive restriction. See
e.g. [Pryor 2000, 2004] and [Davis 2004, 2009] for defences of unrestricted transmission princi-
ples, and [Wright 2002, 2003] and [White 2006] for arguments that transmission principles afford
restriction. For the purposes of this paper, I would like to bracket this issue. I will work with
TRANSMISSION-JB as it is, without restrictions. To compensate for the presumptuousness of an
unrestricted transmission principle, I will here consider TRANSMISSION-JB only insofar as it ap-
plies to uncontroversial cases like Inference.
12 Again, this argument presupposes Counter-Transmission. Foes of this principle may note
that my argument will still serve to show that TRANSMISSION-JB fails in all cases in which (i)
the justified premise belief that falls short of knowledge and (ii) the relevant instances of Counter-
Transmission hold.
10
from non-knowledge, b2 falls short of knowledge at all members of Σ. Hence, by
KFM, b2, while arrived at via competently deductive reasoning from a justified
premise belief, will itself be unjustified. On KFM, TRANSMISSION-JB fails for
any justified belief that falls short of knowledge. Inference is but one case in point.
No surprise, then, that KFM makes the wrong prediction in this case.13
3 Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology
In what follows, I would like to develop an alternative knowledge first epistemo-
logical account of justified belief. Unlike the accounts discussed in the previous
sections, my account is virtue epistemological. In particular, it follows a popular
trend among recent virtue epistemologists in it takes the normativity of belief to
drop out of an attractive general framework for the normativity of performances
with an aim [Sosa 2007, 2011, 2015, Greco 2010, 2012]. According to this frame-
work, performances with an aim can be evaluated along the following three di-
mensions: (i) is the performance successful, i.e. does it attain its aim?; (ii) is the
performance competent, i.e., roughly, is it produced by an exercise of an ability
to attain its aim?; (iii) is the performance apt, i.e., roughly, is it successful be-
cause competent? Moreover, my account also follows recent virtue epistemology
in identifying knowledge with apt belief and justified belief with competent belief.
13 It may be worth briefly considering an argument Bird offers to the effect that KFM can ac-
commodate transmission principles like TRANSMISSION-JB:
Knowledge is spread by such inferences because they preserve a reliable connection
between true belief and corresponding fact. It is because of the possibility of spread-
ing knowledge by inference that justification too can typically be transmitted in this
way (even in cases where knowledge is only possible and not actual). Consider a
straightforward case. Let S have a justified belief that p. Let S infer from the propo-
sition that p the proposition that q, by a simple deduction. We need to show that S’s
belief that q is also justified. Since S is justified in believing that p, by [KFM] there
is a possible world w (which might or might not be the actual world) in which S has
some corresponding knowledge. In this case let us assume that it is knowledge that
p. Let it be that in some world w∗ near to w (which might be w itself) in which S
also knows that p, S infers that q by the aforementioned simple deductive inference.
Since knowledge is transmitted by such inferences, in w∗ S thereby comes to know
that q. Since w∗ is a possible world in which S comes to know that q by the same
process by which S comes to believe that q in the actual world, then by [KFM] S’s
belief that q in the actual world is justified.
[Bird 2007: 91]
This argument fails. To see why, let’s focus on the last step. Bird claims that since w∗ is a possible
world in which S comes to know that q by the same process by which S comes to believe that q in
the actual world, then, by KFM, S’s belief that q is justified in the actual world. In fact, this is not
quite right. The fact that, at w∗, S comes to know that q via the same process by which S comes
to believe that q in the actual world is not sufficient for S’s belief in the actual world to qualify as
knowledge, at least not by KFM. It will only be sufficient given the additional assumption that S
and his counterpart at w∗ share the same mental history up until the point of belief formation. It is
easy to see that once this additional condition is satisfied the above argument serves to show that
KFM is as a matter of fact incompatible with TRANSMISSION-JB.
11
On the account I want to propose, then, a belief is justified if and only if it
is competent. I also already said that this means, roughly, that it must have been
produced by an exercise of ability to attain its aim. Of course, this immediately
raises the following questions. What is the aim of belief? What is an ability? And
what does it take to exercise an ability? In order to arrive at an account that is
sufficiently well developed to be compared to the views discussed above, these
questions need to be answered. In other words, the account needs to be made more
precise. This is the task I will tackle in what follows. Since I want the account
to drop out of an account that works for performances with an aim (or at least a
certain type thereof) in general, I will start by developing an account of competent
performances for performances in a certain kind of practice, which I will call a
simple goal-directed practices (SGPs).
3.1 Simple Goal-Directed Practices
THE FRAMEWORK
A simple goal-directed practice is goal-directed. This means that it has a suc-
cess condition, a condition under which the practice’s goal is attained. A simple
goal-directed practice is simple in the following sense. It features two types of
particular, moves and targets, and a designated relation. A success in an SGP
can be defined as a move that stands in the designated relation to the target. One
example of an SGP is the following version of target archery, call it ‘ARCH’, in
which moves are shots taken from a certain distance, targets are discs of a certain
circumference and the designated relation is the hit relation. A success in ARCH
is a shot that hits the target.
With the basic framework in play, I would like to offer the following accounts
of (i) abilities to attain success in a given SGP, (ii) exercises thereof and (iii) com-
petent moves in an SGP.
SGP ABILITIES
Roughly, SGP abilities are ways of move production that dispose its possessor to
attain success in SGPs, at least provided he is in suitable shape and situational
conditions.14
14 Since, on this account, abilities crucially involve dispositions to succeed, the account is similar
to the accounts of ability offered by Sosa [2010, 2015] and Greco [2010, 2012]. Despite this
similarity, my accounts differs from Sosa’s and Greco’s in a number of relevant respects. For
starters, on my account abilities a relative to ways of move production. In contrast, neither Sosa
nor Greco relativise abilities to ways of performing. Rather, what matters is that the agent attains
success across nearby worlds at a high rate [Greco 2010: 77] or that the agent would succeed were
she to try [Sosa 2015: 96]. There is reason to believe that, as a result, my account is preferable to
both Sosa’s and Greco’s. To see why, consider an agent who has two ways of performing such as
an archer who can shoot with his left or with his right. Suppose one and only one way of producing
performances qualifies as an ability: the archer is right-handed, say. Even so, it might be that the
agent is disposed to produce performances in the way that doesn’t qualify as an ability. Perhaps
our archer vowed never to shoot with his right again and has now taken to shoot with his left. In
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For instance, to have the ability to hit the target in ARCH is to have a way
of shooting that disposes one to hit the target in ARCH, at least when in suitable
shape (e.g. awake, sufficiently concentrated, not too drunk, etc.) and situational
conditions (e.g. normal winds, enough light, etc.).
SGP abilities need not just be one-trick ponies, as it were. Rather, they may
span ranges of SGPs. For instance, a way of shooting that disposes one to hit the
target in ARCH, in which the target is a disc with a certain circumference, may
also dispose one to hit the target in ARCH’, in which the target is a square with
the same surface area, or in ARCH”, in which the target is a disc with an ever so
slightly smaller circumference. In that case, one’s ability to hit the target spans a
range of SGPs, including ARCH, ARCH’ and ARCH”.
Here is a more precise account of SGP abilities:
SGP ABILITY. One has an ability to attain success in a range, R, of SGPs and relative to
conditions of shape, SH, and situational conditions SI if and only if one has a way
of move production, W , such that, for any S ∈ R, using W in SH and SI disposes
one to attain success in S.15,16
this case, the agent will have the ability even though she will not be such as to attain success across
nearby worlds at a high rate, nor will she be such as to succeed were she to try. Having taken
the vow, the archer will not hit the target across nearby worlds with a high rate of success, nor
would she hit the target were she to try. The reason for this is of course that were she to try, she
would shoot with her left and fail to hit the target. Sosa and Greco’s account of abilities are too
coarse-grained. It is easy to see that the present account, which relativises abilities to ways of move
production, avoids this problem. For more one how my account of abilities compares with standard
virtue epistemological ones (such as Sosa’s and Greco’s) see [Kelp 2015c].
15 Note that there is a difference between genuine abilities and mere dispositions to attain some
success or other. SGP ABILITIES does not appear to have the resources to accommodate this dif-
ference. I agree. In fact, I discuss this issue in more detail in [Kelp 2015c], where I follow [Millikan
2000: ch. 4] in arguing that genuine abilities must satisfy an etiological condition. Very roughly,
the thought is that to qualify as an SGP ability, a way of move production must have been shaped
through interaction with the environment, by a learning process or by natural selection, and, as a re-
sult must have become “tuned” [Millikan 2000: 63] to the environment. (Note that, as a result, my
account differs in yet another respect from the accounts of Sosa and Greco (see fn.14) who do not
countenance such an etiological condition on abilities.) I also argue that his etiological condition
does some epistemological work. In particular, it serves to deal with clairvoyant-style cases [Kelp
2015c] and the lottery paradox [Kelp 2015e]. That said, the distinction between genuine abilities
and mere dispositions does no substantive theoretical work in this paper. To see this, notice that
any account of abilities will need some way of drawing the distinction between genuine abilities
and mere dispositions. At the same time, none of the arguments I adduce presuppose any particular
way of doing this. Moreover, in all the relevant cases discussed below, it is independently plausible
that the agents’ ways of belief formation qualify as genuine abilities rather than mere dispositions.
For the purposes of this paper, then, the distinction between genuine abilities and mere dispositions
can safely be set aside and the etiological condition can safely be assumed to be satisfied.
16 The dispositions involved in SGP abilities can be either surefire or probabilistic dispositions
[Healey 1991, Suarez 2007]. Surefire dispositions are dispositions such that the (conditional) prob-
ability of manifestation given the stimulus condition and suitable conditions is 1. Probabilistic
dispositions are dispositions such that the probability of manifestation given the stimulus condi-
tions and suitable conditions is smaller than 1. An SGP ability features a surefire disposition just in
case the probability of success given an exercise of the ability in suitable SH and SI is 1, otherwise
it features a probabilistic disposition.
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EXERCISES OF SGP ABILITIES
Exercises of SGP abilities are then defined in terms of uses of the ways of move
production at issue in the ability:
SGP EXERCISE. One exercises an ability, A, to attain success for a range, R, of SGPs
and relative to SH and SI, if and only if one has A and produces a move via the way
of move production at issue in A.
What’s important here is that unsuitable SI do not prevent one from using one’s
way of move production and hence from exercising one’s ability, whilst unsuitable
SH do. For instance, a skilled practitioner of ARCH who produces a shot whilst
being too drunk does not exercise his ability to hit the target in ARCH. In contrast,
when his shot is blown of target by a gust of wind, he may still have exercised his
ability.17
COMPETENT SGP MOVES
Recall that I said that a competent performance is, roughly, a performance that is
produced by the exercise of an ability to attain the performance’s aim. With SGP
ABILITY and SGP EXERCISE in play, then, we may think that we have all we need
in order to offer a precise account of competent moves in an SGP. On reflection,
however, there is reason to believe that competent moves require more than just
the exercise of ability. To see this, note that you may not have the ability to hit
the target in certain variations of ARCH, such as variations in which the target is
moving quickly, randomly and discontinuously. Even so, you may have the ability
to hit the target in ARCH and you may exercise it. However, when you do, it would
seem that you have not produced a competent move in the version of ARCH you
are engaging in.
These considerations suggest that we need an additional condition on compe-
tent moves in SGPs. Here is my proposal: For a move in an SGP to be competent
it must (i) be produced by an exercise of an SGP ability and (ii) the SGP must be
in the range of the ability exercised. Or, again, more precisely:
17 It is worth noting that, on the present account, the notion of exercise of ability is not a success
notion. In this way, it differs from Millar’s (see fn.4). In fact, this difference is one of two key
differences that ultimately allow my account to solve the Gettier problem. The other difference is,
of course, that my account replaces Millar’s accessibilist approach to justified belief by a virtue
epistemological one, which identifies justified belief with competent belief. Since the notion of
exercise of ability is not a success notion, my account allows for competent but unsuccessful moves
and, as a result, for competent but false beliefs. (This will become clear in due course.) Since my
account is virtue epistemological, this means that there can be justified but false beliefs. And this
is of course essential to standing any chance of accommodating the presence of justified belief in
Gettier and Counterpart cases. For that reason I take it that the fact that, on my account, the notion
of exercise of ability is not a success notion constitutes a key improvement on Millar’s alternative.
For a more detailed comparison of my account of abilities and their exercises and Millar’s see [Kelp
and Ghijsen 2016].
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COMPETENT SGP MOVE. A move in a given SGP, S, is competent if and only if it is
produced by an exercise of an ability to attain success within a certain range R of
SGPs and relative to SH and SI such that S ∈ R.
3.2 Belief
INQUIRY AS AN SGP
With the general framework for SGPs and the account of competent move in an
SGP in play, I would now move on to the application to belief. In particular, I
would like to suggest that inquiry into specific whether questions can be viewed as
an SGP, or better: as a set of SGPs (one for each question). The idea here is that
the targets of inquiry are correct answers. For instance, the target of an inquiry
into whether p is the proposition that p, if p is true and the proposition that not-p,
if p is false. Moves in inquiry are beliefs. For instance, believing p constitutes
a move in an inquiry into whether p, as does believing not-p. The designated
relation in inquiry is the knowledge relation.18 A success in inquiry, then, is a
belief that qualifies as knowledge (henceforth also ‘a knowledgeable belief’ for
short). For instance, my belief that p stands in the designated relation to the target
of an inquiry into whether p if and only if it qualifies as knowledge that p.
ABILITIES TO KNOW, ETC.
The corresponding accounts of abilities to know, their exercises and competent
moves in inquiry are then straightforward:
ABILITY TO KNOW. One has an ability to know propositions in a range, R, and relative
to SH and SI, if and only if one has a way of belief formation, W , such that, for any
p ∈ R, using W in SH and SI disposes one to form knowledgeable beliefs that p.
EXERCISES OF ABILITIES TO KNOW. One exercises an ability, A, to know propositions
in range R and relative to conditions SH and SI if and only if one has A and forms a
belief via the way of belief formation at issue in A.
COMPETENT BELIEF. One competently believes that p if and only if one’s belief that p
is formed by an exercise of an ability to know propositions in range R and relative
to conditions SH and SI such that p ∈ R.
18 Note that taking knowledge to be the designated relation is what makes the account knowledge
first epistemological. The framework can also be used to develop a traditionalist virtue epistemol-
ogy. All we need to do is take the designated relation to be the correspondence relation between
belief and true answer, where a belief corresponds to a true answer if and only if its content is
identical to the true answer. In [Kelp 2015c] I argue that the resulting account of justified belief
allows us to make progress on both traditional process reliabilist and alternative traditionalist virtue
epistemological accounts.
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JUSTIFIED BELIEF
Recall that I follow virtue epistemology in identifying justified belief with com-
petent belief. This means that we get the following precise account of justified
belief:
KFVE. One justifiably believes that p just in case one believes that p via an exercise of
an ability to know propositions within R and relative to SH and SI such that p ∈ R.
KFVE is clearly a virtue epistemological account of justified belief. That said,
it is also knowledge first epistemological. After all, it identifies justified beliefs
with competent belief and analyses competent belief in terms of abilities to know.
Knowledge thus enjoys explanatory priority over justified belief.
One nice feature of the account is that it serves to accommodate all of the
hallmark properties of justified belief outlined in §1.4 above. KFVE features a
kind of reliability condition on justified belief. As a result, it can accommodate
justified belief’s hallmark property of being connected to knowledge and truth.
Moreover, KFVE identifies justified belief with a kind of competent performance.
Since, according to the general account of performance normativity, competent
performances is in general enjoy positive normative standing, the same goes for
justified belief.
KFVE offers an appealing knowledge first epistemological account of justified
belief. In what follows, I will return to the problems that rival accounts in the
knowledge first camp encountered. I will argue that KFVE steers clear of these
problems, thus making the account look even more attractive.
4 KFVE in Action
Strong KFE accounts of justified belief ran into difficulties already with Gettier
(and Counterpart) cases involving non-inferential knowledge. Bird, who offers a
weak KFE account, could avoid Gettier cases involving non-inferential knowledge
but ran into trouble with inferential Gettier cases. In what follows, I will look at
how KFVE fares with respect to both kinds of Gettier (and Counterpart) case.
4.1 Non-Inferential Gettier Cases
To begin with, recall why strong KFE accounts of justified belief face the Gettier
problem. According to such accounts, justified belief is sufficient for knowledge.
Gettier cases provide reason to think that this is too strong, i.e. that one can have a
justified belief that falls short of knowledge.
In contrast, we need not expect justified belief to entail knowledge on KFVE.
Here is one way to see this. According to the general account of performance
normativity associated with virtue epistemology, while apt performance requires
competent performance, competent performance does not require apt performance.
Given that my favoured form of virtue epistemology identifies justified belief with
competent belief and knowledge with apt belief, we need not expect that, on this
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form of virtue epistemology, justified belief entails knowledge. This means that
KFVE is at least in the running for improving on strong KFE accounts of justified
belief.
Of course, not being disqualified from getting Gettier and Counterpart cases
right from the very start is one thing; actually getting them right is quite another.
Let’s return, then, to our toy example of the kind of Gettier/Counterpart case that
causes trouble for strong KFE accounts of justified belief, to wit Fake Barns. Re-
call that here you are in Fake Barn County, see what appears to be a barn and
thereupon come to believe that you are facing a barn. In this case, you acquire
your belief that you are looking at a barn in a way, W , that does not qualify as
such an ability relative to your actual situational conditions, SIA. After all, in these
situational conditions, using your way of belief formation does not dispose you
to acquire knowledgeable beliefs about the presence of barns. That said, in more
favourable situational conditions (SIF ), using W does dispose you to form knowl-
edgeable beliefs about the presence of barns. For instance, it does so in certain
situational conditions such that everything that looks like a barn actually is a barn.
By ABILITY TO KNOW, W qualifies as an ability to know propositions about the
presence of barns relative to SIF . Since you form your belief via W , by EXER-
CISE OF ABILITY TO KNOW, you form your belief via the exercise of an ability
to know propositions about the presence of barns relative to SIF . Moreover, the
target proposition is within the range of this ability as it concerns the presence of
a barn. Since you form your belief via the exercise of an ability to know such that
the target proposition is within the range of this ability, by COMPETENT BELIEF,
your belief is competent and so, by KFVE, justified. All we need to do to turn
the case into a Gettier case is stipulate that your belief is true as you happen to
be looking at one of the few real barns. Alternative, we can turn the case into a
Counterpart case by assuming that you structure you are looking at is a fake. Since
KFVE’s verdict of justification stands no matter how we fill in the details of the
case, it comes to light that KFVE makes the right predictions in both the Gettier
and the Counterpart version of the case.19
4.2 Inferential Gettier Cases
Let’s move on to the kinds of inferential Gettier cases that Bird’s weak KFE ac-
count of justified belief, KFM, falls prey to. Recall that the reason why KFM
couldn’t get inferential Gettier cases right is that, on KFM, TRANSMISSION-JB
fails for any justified premise belief that falls short of knowledge. This, in turn,
is because, KFM accepts both of the following two claims: (i) one’s belief that q
is justified only if some agent who shares one’s mental history can come to know
that q, whilst (ii) knowledge is a mental state in its own right. Anyone who accepts
19 It is easy to see the account will work equally well for standard non-inferential Get-
tier/Counterpart cases such as the so-called stopped clock case in which you acquire an intuitively
justified belief about the time by taking an accurate and competent reading from a stopped clock
you know to have worked highly reliable and you have no reason to think isn’t doing so now. See
[Kelp 2015d] for further details.
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both of (i) and (ii) will have the problematic result. After all, given (ii), no agent
who knows that p shares one’s mental history. Moreover, since no one who doesn’t
know that p could come to know that q via competent deductive reasoning from
p, no one who shares one’s mental history can come to know that q via competent
deductive reasoning from p and so, by (i) no one who shares one’s mental his-
tory and believes that q via such reasoning will have a justified belief. In contrast,
KFVE is wedded to neither (i) nor (ii).20 Once again, this means that KFVE is at
least in the running for doing better here.
Now it might be thought that so long as we have no reason to think that KFVE
is incompatible with TRANSMISSION-JB, then we are entitled to assume that
KFVE is compatible with it. If so, champions of KFVE are surely free to help
themselves to TRANSMISSION-JB, at least until further notice. But if champions
of KFVE may help themselves to TRANSMISSION-JB, then there is every reason
to believe that they can handle inferential Gettier and Counterpart cases without
much difficulty. After all, what’s key to these cases is that the conclusion belief is
arrived at via competent deductive reasoning from a justified but unknown premise
belief. For instance, in Inference you come to believe a true conclusion—that you
were looking at a barn or that the number of stars in the universe is even—from a
justified but false premise belief—that you were looking at a barn. The status of
the premise belief is not really what’s problematic in these cases. Moreover, we
have already seen how, according to KFVE, premise beliefs can be justified even
if they are not known. For instance, the above treatment of Fake Barns shows how
this works for the premise belief in Inference. If champions of KFVE are entitled
to help themselves to TRANSMISSION-JB, then, they can easily secure the result
that the conclusion beliefs of agents in inferential Gettier cases are justified also.
But perhaps not everybody is so lenient in granting that champions of KFVE
are free to help themselves to TRANSMISSION-JB, just because we have no rea-
son to think the two are incompatible. Some might doubt that the mere fact that
there is no reason to think the two to be incompatible suffices for an entitlement to
assume their compatibility. Others might worry that even if champions of KFVE
are entitled to assume that TRANSMISSION-JB is compatible with their view, this
doesn’t mean that they are also entitled to help themselves to it. Such sceptics will
maintain that before they are willing to grant that champions of KFVE are enti-
tled to help themselves to TRANSMISSION-JB, they’d want to see some positive
reason that this principle is indeed available to champions of KFVE. In what fol-
lows, I will address the worries of these sceptics. More specifically, I will argue
that, modulo certain assumptions, KFVE entails TRANSMISSION-JB. Since the
assumptions are clearly available to champions of KFVE, so is TRANSMISSION-
20 Interestingly, KFVE, even in conjunction with TRANSMISSION-JB, is compatible with either
of them. It is compatible with (ii) given that justification does not supervene on one’s mental states
and so one can come by a justified conclusion belief even when, holding fixed one’s mental states,
one could not have come to know the conclusion of one’s deduction. It is compatible with (i)
provided that knowledge is not a mental state in its own right and so one can be in the same total
mental state even when one’s premise belief is false.
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4.3 The Transmission of Justification
To begin with, recall the relevant principle:
TRANSMISSION-JB. If one competently deductively reasons from p to q [J1]; if one
thereupon comes to believe that q [J2]; and if one justifiably believes that p through-
out [J3], then one’s belief that q is justified.
Consider next the corresponding transmission principle for knowledge, i.e.:
TRANSMISSION-K. If one competently deductively reasons from p to q [K1]; if one
thereupon comes to believe that q [K2]; if one knows that p throughout [K3]; and if
one’s deductive reasoning was successful [K4], then one knows that q.21
TRANSMISSION-K is available to champions of KFVE. After all, TRANSMISSION-
K does not explicitly feature the concept of justified belief. Moreover, on KFVE,
knowledge enjoys explanatory priority over justified belief and so TRANSMISSION-
K does not presuppose this concept either. In this way, on KFVE, TRANSMISSION-
K does not dependent for its truth on facts about justified belief. If so, it should be
uncontroversial that TRANSMISSION-K is available to champions of KFVE.22
21 For defences of an unrestricted transmission principle for knowledge see e.g. [Williamson
2000] and [2004], for denials see e.g. [Dretske 1970, 2005] and [Nozick 1981].
22 Here is my response to those sceptical even of this claim. First, according to my account of
knowledge [Kelp 2015d], the following is a necessary condition for knowledge:
(1) One knows that p only if one competently believes that p in SI.
Moreover, when the relevant ability to know features a surefire disposition (fn.16), the converse
holds also, i.e.:
(2) One knows that p if and only if one competently believes that p in SI.
Second, consider the following bridge principles between TRANSMISSION-K and (2):
(3) [K1] and [K2] hold if and only if one believes that q via the exercise of an ability to know
propositions by deductive reasoning, ADeduction, where q is within the range of ADeduction.
(4) [K3] and [K4] identify SI required by ADeduction.
Third, consider these assumptions:
(5) The disposition at issue in ADeduction is a surefire disposition.
(6) There are no other SI required by ADeduction besides the ones mentioned in (4), i.e. [K3] and
[K4].
(2) – (6) jointly entail (and thus validate) TRANSMISSION-K. To see this notice first that if the
disposition at issue in some SGP ability is of the surefire kind, then the probability of success given
an exercise of it is 1 and so the success is guaranteed, at least given that the SGP is within the
ability’s range and the SH and SI required by the ability are in place. As per (5), the disposition
at issue in ADeduction is a surefire disposition. For that reason, the exercise of ADeduction guarantees
knowledge that q, at least given that q is within the range of ADeduction and ADeduction’s SH and SI
are in place. Now, by (3), q is within ADeduction’s range. Moreover, also by (3), ADeduction’s SH are
satisfied. After all, an exercise of an SGP ability requires that the SH are satisfied and so the fact
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Note that in order to acquire inferential knowledge that q in accordance with
TRANSMISSION-K, one must [K1] have arrived at one’s belief that q via [K2]
competent deductive reasoning. In this way, TRANSMISSION-K effectively fea-
tures a competence condition. This raises the question as to what it takes to arrive
at a belief that q via competent deductive reasoning. KFVE’s account of compe-
tent belief serves to provide an answer to this question: one arrives at a belief that
q via competent deductive reasoning if and only if one arrives at it via the exercise
of an ability to know propositions by deduction such that q is in the range of this
ability. Given that this is so, TRANSMISSION-K can be plausibly connected with
KFVE’s account of competent belief in the following way:
BRIDGE 1. [K1] and [K2] hold if and only if one believes that q via the exercise of an
ability to know propositions by deductive reasoning, ADeduction, where q is within
the range of ADeduction.23
Finally, a claim that is not only available to but very much in the spirit of KFVE
is that TRANSMISSION-JB is derivative from TRANSMISSION-K in the sense that
the ability one needs to exercise in order to acquire a justified conclusion belief is
the very ability to know propositions by deductive reasoning at issue in BRIDGE 1,
i.e. ADeduction. In particular, champions of KFVE are free to embrace the following
bridge principle between KFVE, BRIDGE 1 and TRANSMISSION-JB:
BRIDGE 2. [J1] and [J2] hold if and only if one believes that q via the exercise of
ADeduction, where q is within the range of ADeduction.
Note that BRIDGE 2 and KFVE entail that [J1] and [J2] hold if and only if one
justifiably believes that q. It follows from this claim that if [J1], [J2] and [J3] hold,
then one justifiably believes that q. And that’s, of course, just TRANSMISSION-JB.
In conjunction with TRANSMISSION-K, BRIDGE 1 and BRIDGE 2, KFVE entails
TRANSMISSION-JB. Since all of TRANSMISSION-K, BRIDGE 1 and BRIDGE 2
are clearly available to champions of KFVE, so is TRANSMISSION-JB.
that, as per (3), ADeduction is exercised entails that ADeduction’s SH are satisfied. Finally, given (4)
and (6), ADeduction’s SI must be in place. After all, by (4) and (6), [K3] and [K4] specify the only
SI required by ADeduction. It comes to light that, given (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), believing that q via
the exercise of an ability to know propositions by deductive reasoning, ADeduction, where q is within
the range of ADeduction, is sufficient for knowledge that q. Since (2) – (6) are clearly available
to champions of KFVE and since the jointly validate TRANSMISSION-K, TRANSMISSION-K is
available to champions of KFVE also.
23 Doesn’t this mean that the resulting version of TRANSMISSION-K depends on the proposed
account of justified belief? No. To see why not, just note that the proposed account of competent
belief enjoys explanatory priority over the proposed account of justified belief. After all, according
to KFVE, justified belief is analysed in terms of competent belief, not the other way around. Given
that this is so, the fact that BRIDGE 1 employs the account of competent belief does not mean that
it the resulting version of TRANSMISSION-K depends on the proposed account of justified belief.
It may also be worth noting that, on my account of knowledge, there is a competence condi-
tion on knowledge of exactly the form at issue in the right-hand side of BRIDGE 1 (see fn.22
above). As I argue in more detail in [Kelp 2015d], this competence condition is independently mo-
tivated. If so, BRIDGE 1 is not just ad hoc either. Rather, it provide an attractive way of connecting
TRANSMISSION-K with an independently motivated condition on knowledge.
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Unfortunately, however, there remains one fly in the ointment. The claim en-
tailed by BRIDGE 2 and KFVE, that [J1] and [J2] hold if and only if justifiably
believes that q, is too strong. To see this, suppose that one satisfies [J1] and [J2],
i.e. one competently deductively reasons from p to q and thereupon forms a be-
lief that q. By the above claim, it follows that one’s belief is justified. But now
suppose, furthermore, one’s belief that p is entirely unjustified. In that case, one’s
belief that q is certainly not justified either.24 If so, the claim entailed by BRIDGE
2 and KFVE is too strong.
Fortunately, this difficulty can be overcome. One attractive way of doing this
is by restricting KFVE to epistemically basic beliefs, i.e. beliefs that, for their
justification, do not depend on the epistemic status of other beliefs one holds.
In line with a modest foundationalist requirement on the structure of justification
champions of KFVE may add that, in the case of epistemically non-basic beliefs,
the status of justification will be granted if and only if, in addition to the conditions
specified in KFVE, the following proviso is satisfied: the beliefs on which they
depend are also justified. It is easy to see that once the modest foundationalist
requirement is in place, BRIDGE 2 and KFVE do not entail that one’s belief that
q is justified if and only if [J1] and [J2] hold. After all, in cases in which one
comes to believe that q by deductive reasoning from p, the epistemic status of the
former belief depends on the latter’s and so the modest foundationalist requirement
applies. Rather, once we have added the modest foundationalist requirement to
TRANSMISSION-K, BRIDGE1, BRIDGE 2 and KFVE, the result that we get is that
one’s belief that q is justified if and only if [J1], [J2], and [J3] hold.
It comes to light that KFVE can be shown to entail (a plausible version of)
TRANSMISSION-JB, at least on the assumption that TRANSMISSION-K, BRIDGE1,
BRIDGE 2 and the modest foundationalist requirement are true. All of these as-
sumptions are clearly available to champions of KFVE. In fact, I believe that they
are also plausible. If so, there is every reason to believe that champions of KFVE
can plausibly accept TRANSMISSION-JB. The worries of the above sceptics in this
regard can be laid to rest.
Conclusion
It comes to light that KFVE improves on rival knowledge first accounts of justified
belief in both the strong and the weak camp. Strong competitors struggle with
Gettier cases. They cannot accommodate the intuition of justified belief in these
cases. Moreover, their attempt at discrediting this intuition by holding that it arises
from a confusion between justification and blamelessness also failed. On this line,
24 Again, I am bracketing cases of failure of Counter-Transmission here (and in my response to
this kind of worry below). Even if it turns out that Counter-Transmission does not hold with full
generality, it remains overwhelmingly plausible that a restricted version of Counter-Transmission
will have to be true. Given that this is so, we can leave the fine-tuning of the response I am
about to give to the kind of problem at hand until we have a suitably restricted version of Counter-
Transmission.
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they are bound to collapse an important normative difference between agents in
Gettier cases and agents in cases like Insanity and Benighted Isolation. Bird’s
weak alternative can improve on the shortcomings of its strong cousins in that it
manages to successfully deal with non-inferential Gettier cases. However, in the
end, Bird’s view also doesn’t manage to solve the Gettier problem. He stumbles
over inferential Gettier cases. The reason for this is that his view is incompatible
with a plausible transmission principle for justified belief. KFVE, in contrast,
steers clear of the problems on both sides. It passes the right verdicts in both
inferential and non-inferential Gettier cases. KFVE can also uphold the normative
distinction between agents in Gettier cases and agents in cases like Insanity and
Benighted Isolation, and the plausible transmission principle for justified belief is
arguably available to its champions.25
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